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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the most significant differences between the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the California Evidence Code is the allocation between judge
and jury of the responsibility for finding preliminary facts. The difference,
however, did not emerge from conscious drafting choices in the original
Federal Rules of Evidence and the original California Evidence Code.
Initially, both appeared quite consistent in distinguishing between
preliminary facts upon which the relevancy of evidence depends, and all
other preliminary factual determinations. The divergence was created by
the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence by the United States
Supreme Court in Bouraily v. United States,' and the subsequent
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. Thanks to Professor Ellen
Kreitzberg of Santa Clara for helpful suggestions, and to Lauren Fair, '08, for research assistance.
1. 483 U.S. 171,184 (1987).
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amendment of the Rules to conform to and expand the Bourjaily
interpretation.2
This paper will advance the proposition that Bourjaily has injected
inconsistency and confusion into the Federal Rules of Evidence that have
been avoided under the California Evidence Code. I conclude that the
treatment of the allocation of responsibility for the finding of preliminary
facts currently embodied in the California Evidence Code is superior to the
post-Bourjaily Federal Rules of Evidence and should be retained.
II. THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING PRELIMINARY
FACTS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE
The fundamental distinction made in the California Evidence Code in
allocating responsibility for finding preliminary facts is the distinction
between those preliminary facts that determine the relevancy of the
proffered evidence, and the preliminary facts that determine some other
aspect of the competency of the evidence.3 Section 403 of the California
Evidence Code lists four categories of preliminary facts where the
proponent need only present evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
4preliminary fact by the jury.
Under section 403, the jury is instructed to first resolve the
determination of the preliminary fact.5 If the jury finds the preliminary fact
is true, they can then consider the evidence.6 If they determine the
preliminary fact is not true, they are instructed by the judge to disregard the
evidence.7 The four categories of preliminary facts listed in section 403
are:
The relevance of the proffered evidence depends on the existence of the
preliminary fact; The preliminary fact is the personal knowledge of a
witness concerning the subject matter of his testimony; The preliminary
fact is the authenticity of a writing; or The proffered evidence is of a
statement or other conduct of a particular person and the preliminary fact
is whether that person made the statement or so conducted himself.8
With some justification, Justice Otto Kaus accused the drafters of
2. FED. R. EVID. 104.
3. CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 (West 2004).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
[Vol. 36
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section 403 of being lovers of redundancy. 9 Arguably, the categories listed
in subsections (2), (3) and (4) are all examples of relevance, which is listed
as the first category. Professor Miguel M~ndez suggests that the personal
knowledge requirement listed in subsection (2) does not rest upon concepts
of relevance, but even that could be debated.'°
Section 405 then provides that all preliminary factual determinations
not governed by section 403 (or section 404, not relevant to this discussion)
are to be made with finality by the judge. 1 The illustrative examples
offered by the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary in enacting the Code
cross reference each of the Code sections where a preliminary factual
determination would be made in accordance with section 403, i.e.,
submission of the question to the jury after the proponent presents evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the preliminary fact.' 2 They include:
section 702, the requirement of personal knowledge; sections 1400-1402,
the requirement of authentication of writings; and with respect to all
hearsay exceptions in sections 1200-1341, the requirement of proof of the
identity of a hearsay declarant.1
3
Of particular interest for present purposes, the Assembly Committee
Commentary to section 403 also lists each of the California hearsay
exceptions for party admissions, noting that the preliminary factual
questions which they raise will ordinarily be decided by the jury pursuant to
section 403.14 The admissions of a party offered pursuant to section 1220
require the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the
party made the statement. 15 Authorized and adoptive admissions offered
under sections 1221 or 1222 require introduction of evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding that the statement was authorized or adopted by the party
against whom it is offered.' 6 With respect to coconspirator statements, the
comment provides: "The admission of a co-conspirator is another form of
an authorized admission. Hence, the proffered evidence is admissible upon
the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the
conspiracy. Existing law is in accord.'
17
The definition of the coconspirator exception itself again confirms the
9. Otto M. Kaus, All Power to the Jury - California's Democratic Evidence Code, 4 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 233, 239 n.23 (1971).
10. MIGUEL A. MtNDEZ, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE 337, § 17.02 (1993).
11. CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 (West 2004).
12. CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 (West 2004) law revision commission comments.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
2008]
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role the jury is to play, providing the statement of a coconspirator must (a)
have been made by the declarant while participating in an conspiracy and in
furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy, and (b) have been made
while the defendant was participating in the conspiracy, and must be
offered "either after admission of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of
the facts specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) or, in the court's discretion as
to the order of proof, subject to the admission of such evidence." 18
Thus, the California Evidence Code consistently treats all preliminary
questions of conditional relevance the same: the offering party need only
present evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the existence of the
preliminary fact. 19 The evidence will then be presented to the jury with an
instruction to disregard it unless the jury finds the preliminary fact does
exist. 20 Additionally, the California Evidence Code makes it abundantly
clear that the preliminary factual showings necessary to admit every form
of party admission are questions of conditional relevance.21
Section 403(c)(1) further provides that if proffered evidence is
admitted pursuant to section 403, the court "[m]ay, and on request shall,
instruct the jury to determine whether the preliminary fact exists and to
disregard the proffered evidence unless the jury finds the preliminary fact
exists. ' 22  Thus, California juries are routinely instructed to disregard
evidence if a preliminary fact that determines the relevancy of the evidence
is found not to exist.23 Typical is the standard instruction recommended by
the California Judicial Council with respect to coconspirator's statements:
In deciding whether the People have proved that (the defendant)
committed the crime charged, you may not consider any statement made
out of court by (the coconspirator) unless the People have proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that:
Some evidence other than the statement itself establishes that a
conspiracy to commit a crime existed when the statement was made;
(The coconspirator) was a member of and participating in the
conspiracy when he made the statement;
(The coconspirator) made the statement in order to further the goal of
the conspiracy; AND
The statement was made before or during the time that (the
defendant) was participating in the conspiracy.
18. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1223 (West 2004).
19. CAL. EvID. CODE § 403 (West 2004).
20. Id.
21. CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 (West 2004) law revision commission comments.
22. CAL. EviD. CODE § 403 (West 2004).
23. Id.
[Vol. 36
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A statement means an oral or written expression, or nonverbal conduct
intended to be a substitute for an oral or written expression. Proof by a
preponderance of evidence is a different standard of proof than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.
[You may not consider statements made by a person who was not a
member of the conspiracy even if the statements helped accomplish the
goal of the conspiracy.] [You may not consider statements made after the
goal of the conspiracy had been accomplished.]24
California appellate courts have held that the trial court has a sua
sponte duty to give such an instruction whenever coconspirator statements
are admitted, even if a request pursuant to section 403 has not been made.25
III. THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING PRELIMINARY
FACTS IN FEDERAL COURTS PRIOR TO BOURJAILY
Prior to the Bourjaily decision, every category of preliminary fact
listed in California Evidence Code section 403 was treated as a question of
conditional relevance governed by the Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b).
Rule 104(b) refers generally to all cases where the relevancy of the
evidence depends upon fulfillment of a condition of fact, providing that the
court shall admit it upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a
finding of the condition.26  Federal Rule 602, which requires personal
knowledge as a prerequisite for any witness to testify to a matter, makes it
clear that the requirement of personal knowledge is a Rule 104(b) question
of conditional relevance by requiring the introduction of evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge.27 Federal
Rule 901(a), which requires authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to the admissibility of any evidence, also makes it clear that
authentication is a Rule 104(b) question of conditional relevance by
requiring the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
28
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not spell out that the question of
whether the particular person claimed to have made a statement or
conducted himself in a particular way actually made the statement or so
24. JUDICIAL COUNSEL CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTION No. 418 (2006).
25. People v. Smith, 231 Cal.Rptr. 897, 905-06 (1986); see JUDICIAL COUNSEL CAL. CRIM.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 418 (2006), bench note.
26. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
27. FED. R. EVID. 602.
28. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
2008]
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conducted himself was also a question of conditional relevance governed by
Rule 104(b), as is done in category (4) of section 403(a) of the California
Evidence Code. 29 However, the Advisory Committee Comment to Federal
Rule 104(b) offers examples that would clearly be governed by California
Evidence Code section 403(a)(4) in a California court:
In some situations, the relevancy of an item of evidence, in the large
sense, depends upon the existence of a particular preliminary fact. Thus
when a spoken statement is relied upon to prove notice to X, it is without
probative value unless X heard it. Or if a letter purporting to be from Y is
relied upon to establish an admission by him, it has no probative value
unless Y wrote or authorized it. Relevance in this sense has been labeled
"conditional relevancy." 30
The requirement of submission of the preliminary question to the jury
is also implicit in the examples of the requirement of identification under
Federal Rule 901(b). 31 The identification of the speaker of a particular
statement based upon the hearing of the voice or other circumstances is
offered as an illustration in which identification requires evidence sufficient
to support a finding.32  The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 901
confirms that this is being treated as a question of conditional relevancy:
"Thus a telephone conversation may be irrelevant... because the speaker
is not identified.,
33
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, lower federal
courts generally treated preliminary questions regarding the admissibility of
party admissions, as questions of conditional relevance to be submitted to
the jury for final determination after the presentation of evidence sufficient
to support a finding.34 The only deviation appeared to be coconspirator
statements, where some lower courts suggested that the judge should
determine admissibility with finality.35  The overwhelming majority of
federal courts treated the admissibility of coconspirator statements as an
issue to be submitted to the jury, after prima facie showing of evidence
sufficient to support a finding.36 In fact, the standard jury instruction not
only submitted the question to the jury, but required the jury to find the
29. CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 (West 2004).
30. FED. R. EvID. 104 advisory committee's note.
31. FED. R. EVID. 901(b).
32. Id.
33. FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
34. United States v. Apollo, 476 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1973); cf Gila Valley, Globe & N. Ry.
Co. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914).
35. EDWARD J. DEVITT & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 29.05
(2d ed. 1970).
36. Id.
[Vol. 36
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existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's membership in it beyond a
reasonable doubt before coconspirator statements could be considered
against a defendant.37 To be sure, there was cogent and weighty criticism
of this instruction. For example, in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in
United States v. Dennis affirming the convictions for Smith Act violations,
he offered dicta that was highly critical of the use of this standard
instruction:
It is difficult to see what value the declarations could have as proof of the
conspiracy, if before using them the jury had to be satisfied that the
declarant and the accused were engaged in the conspiracy charged; for
upon that hypothesis the declarations would merely serve to confirm what
the jury had already decided. In strict logic these instructions in effect
altogether withdrew the declarations from the jury, and it was idle to put
them in at all. The law is indeed not wholly clear as to who must decide
whether such a declaration may be used; but we think that the better
doctrine is that the judge is always to decide, as concededly he generally
must, any issues of fact on which the competence of evidence depends,
and that, if he decides it to be competent, he is to leave it to the jury to use
like any other evidence, without instructing them to consider it as proof
only after they too have decided a preliminary issue which alone makes it
competent. Indeed, it is a practical impossibility for laymen, and for that
matter for most judges, to keep their minds in the isolated compartments
that this requires.
38
Relying upon Judge Hand's dicta, the Ninth Circuit in Carbo v. United
States39 held that coconspirator statements should be admitted with finality
based upon the judge's finding of a prima facie showing of the existence of
the conspiracy and defendant's membership in it.40 Judge Hand's position
was also endorsed by the Second Circuit in United States v. Geaney.41 All
of these decisions, to be sure, begged the fundamental question of whether
the defendant's membership in the conspiracy was an issue of conditional
relevance.42 Judge Hand clearly regarded it as a question of competence,
rather than relevance, and concluded it should be treated the same as every
other issue of competency of evidence, to be decided with finality by the
judge.43
37. Id.
38. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1950), afd, Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
39. 314. F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963).
40. Id. at 737.
41. 417 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (2d Cir. 1969).
42. See Dennis, 183 F.2d at 230-31; Carbo, 314 F.2d at 735-36; Geaney, 417 F.2d at 1120.
43. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 230-3 1.
2008]
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At least with respect to coconspirator statements, the Federal Rules of
Evidence did not explicitly address this question. Nevertheless, the
standard jury instructions used in most federal criminal cases continued to
require submission of the question to the jury, and continued to require a
finding by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.4 The Notes that
accompanied this instruction made it clear that this treatment of the
admissibility issue was consistent with Rule 104(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, rather than Rule 104(a):
Under Rule 105, Federal Rules of Evidence, an instruction restricting the
scope of evidence should be given at the time the evidence is received, if
requested. It would be prudent to give such an instruction at the time
evidence of declarations of alleged coconspirators is received. Rule
104(b) gives the court discretion to receive evidence subject to its being
connected up later.
45
The Note was also critical of the views of the Second and Ninth
Circuit, later joined by the Third Circuit:
It appeared that the Second Circuit may have a view of the law in this area
which is less restrictive from the prosecution's standpoint than that which
prevails elsewhere, and it would appear that the instruction as set out in
the text is safer. The second circuit's view seems similar to that expressed
in United States v. Bey, 437 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1971) and Carbo v. United
States, 314 F.2d 718, 735 (9th Cir. 1963), containing valuable
discussion.... In other circuits, the form on the text seems safer.
4 6
IV. THE BOURJAILY DECISION AND ITS AFTERMATH
In Bourjaily v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
admissibility of a coconspirator's statement under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 47 The question was whether a court could consider the out-of-
court coconspirator statement itself in determining whether the statement
was made in furtherance of a conspiracy of which the defendant was a
member.48 The opinion of the Court, authored by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, assumed that this question would be resolved pursuant to Rule
104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
44. EDWARD J. DEvITr & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 27.06 (3d ed. 1977).
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 173.
48. Id.
[Vol. 36
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Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) provides: "Preliminary questions
concerning... the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court." Petitioner and the government agree that the existence of a
conspiracy and petitioner's involvement in it are preliminary questions of
fact that, under Rule 104, must be resolved by the court.
4 9
Thus, the Court never considered any argument that the preliminary
question should be decided under Rule 104(b), as a question of conditional
relevance. It is readily understandable why both the government and the
Petitioner saw tactical advantages to utilizing Rule 104(a) rather than Rule
104(b). The government could then utilize the "bootstrapping" provision of
Rule 104(a), which provides, "[i]n making its determination [the court] is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges. '5 °  Ultimately, the Court found this language dispositive in
ruling in the government's favor, and allowing the court to consider the
statement itself to determine the preliminary question. 5 The petitioner, on
the other hand, saw an advantage in arguing for a higher standard of proof
on the preliminary question under Rule 104(a).52 Rule 104(b) explicitly
requires only the introduction of evidence "sufficient to support a finding"
of the preliminary fact. 53 Rule 104(a), on the other hand, would require
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.54 Petitioner argued that the proof
had to be independent of the statement itself, relying upon statements to
that effect in two previous precedents of the Court, Glasser v. United
States,5 5 and United States v. Nixon,56 both decided before the Federal Rules
of Evidence enactment in 1975.5v As the Court conceded, the courts of
appeal widely held that in determining the preliminary facts relative to
coconspirator's statements, a court may not look at the hearsay statements
themselves.58 A careful analysis might have revealed that the courts of
appeal were widely requiring independent evidence not because they were
ignoring Rule 104(a)'s adoption of a rule permitting bootstrapping, but
because they were treating the issue as a question of conditional relevance
pursuant to Rule 104(b). In any event, the Supreme Court concluded that
the 1975 adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence prevailed over the
49. Id. at 175.
50. FED R. EvID. 104(a).
51. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181.
52. See id. at 178-79.
53. FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
54. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
55. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
56. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
57. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 176-77.
58. Id. at 177.
2008]
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contrary statements in both Glasser and Nixon, and permitted consideration
of the statement itself in determining its admissibility.59
We might have been left with a mildly mischievous exception for
coconspirator statements after Bourjaily, but in 1997 the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence extended the mischief to
authorized and agent admissions as well. 60 Rule 801(d)(2) was adopted to
not only codify the Bourjaily decision with respect to coconspirator
statements offered under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), but also to permit Rule 104(a)
bootstrapping for statements offered under (C) and (D):
The contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone
sufficient to establish the declarant's authority under subdivision (C), the
agency or employment relationship and scope thereof under subdivision
(D), or the existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein of the
declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered under
subdivision (E).6 1
Apparently, the Advisory Committee had no intention to disturb party
admissions offered pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or (B), in which the
preliminary fact involves the direct conduct of the party himself in making
the statement or manifesting an adoption or belief in its truth.62 No agency
principles come into play in these settings.63 The Advisory Committee
explained:
In Bourjaily, the Court rejected treating foundational facts pursuant to the
law of agency in favor of an evidentiary approach governed by Rule
104(a). The Advisory Committee believes it appropriate to treat
analogously preliminary questions relating to the declarant's authority
under subdivision (C), and the agency or employment relationship and
scope thereof under subdivision (D).64
With all due respect to the Advisory Committee, the suggestion that
Bourjaily was based upon some sort of aversion to the use of the law of
agency in determining preliminary facts finds no support whatsoever in the
decision itself.
The distinction which the Federal Rules now make between direct and
adoptive admissions on the one hand, and authorized, agent and
coconspirator admissions on the other hand, ignores the consistency of the
rationale that supports the admission of all five forms of party admissions.
59. Id. at 181.
60. FED R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's note.
64. Id.
[Vol. 36
HeinOnline  -- 36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 666 2007-2008
A DMISSIBILITY OF PA R TY A DMISSIONS
The reason such admissions are deemed to fall outside of the hearsay rule is
not because of a heightened reliability of the circumstances in which they
are made, but because cross examination is regarded as superfluous. The
reason cross-examination is superfluous is because the person who made
the statement is the person against whom it is now offered, and would only
be cross-examining himself. However, that is not true if the person against
whom the statement is now offered was not the person who made the
statement. Thus, if correct identity is not established as a preliminary fact,
the statement is excluded. However, it is excluded not just because it is
now inadmissible hearsay, but also because it is irrelevant.
I am fully aware that many scholars and judges would dispute the
suggestion that the mere failure to correctly identify the source of an
alleged admission renders the statement irrelevant. Among those who fell
victim to this heresy was my dear, departed friend Otto Kaus. I think Otto
Kaus had a greater understanding of the law of Evidence than any Justice
who ever sat on the California Supreme Court, but he never really
understood conditional relevance.
In his classic critique of the then newly minted California Evidence
Code, Kaus took the drafters to task for confusing identity with relevance.65
"This is nonsense," he asserts. "On D's trial for the murder of V, the
statement 'D murdered V is relevant whoever made it."'66 He then cites a
delightful example offered by Professor Maguire:
An anonymous memorandum, "I killed Cock Robin," is offered in the trial
for murder of that notorious victim. The assertion is incompetent hearsay,
and also irrelevant, unless authorship by the defendant makes it his
admission. Should the trial judge admit the memorandum if there is
enough evidence of such authorship to warrant a favorable finding to this
effect, or should he exclude it unless he himself finds such authorship?
67
Justice Kaus then argues:
I must differ that the proffered evidence presents a problem of
incompetency and irrelevance. Surely at the trial for the murder of Cock
Robin, a confession is relevant whoever made it. The only difference
between "D killed V" and "I killed V" is that different factual conclusions
are drawn by the jury if the declarant is someone other than D. In this
connection it should be pointed out that only a problem of relevance is
presented where the dispute is whether the signature on a confession is
that of D or whether it is a deliberate forgery; no rational trier of fact
65. Kaus, supra note 9, at 238.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 238 n.21 (citing JOHN M. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE - COMMON SENSE AND COMMON
LAW 224-25 (1947)).
2008]
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would find a deliberately forged confession probative of the facts asserted
therein. It should not even be necessary to instruct the jury not to base a
guilty verdict on a confession which it finds to have been written and
signed by the arresting officer.
68
What is going on here is a classic evidentiary error, treating relevance
as an abstraction somehow disconnected from the inferences one seeks to
draw from the evidence. It is quite common that evidence which is
irrelevant to prove one fact may meet the test of relevance if it is offered to
prove some other fact. Under these circumstances, we give the jury a
limiting instruction telling them to use the evidence only for the relevant
purpose. The reason for the limitation, of course, is that the evidence is
irrelevant for the purposes for which it was not admitted. For example, the
statement "D killed V" is hardly relevant for any purpose if it was made by
a drunk in a bar-room who expresses his opinion on every murder he hears
about on TV. Unless we can connect the statement with an identified
person who had personal knowledge, it is irrelevant. The statement "I
killed Cock Robin" might give rise to different factual conclusions if it was
uttered by the defendant or if it was uttered by someone else. Assume a
room full of goodfellas boasting about their homicidal misadventures. An
eavesdropper overhears one of them brag, "I killed Jimmy Hoffa." If this
was offered by the prosecution as an admission, but the prosecutor could
not prove the defendant was the person who said it, would it nonetheless
have relevance? It conceivably could have relevance if offered by the
defendant with proof that someone else said it, to support a SODDI [Some
Other Dude Did It] defense, but that possibility would not overcome a
relevancy objection if it was offered against the defendant. Without proof
of identity, the evidence would be irrelevant to prove the fact it is offered to
prove, that the defendant acknowledged he murdered Jimmy Hoffa.
The relevancy point might be clearer if we eliminate the hearsay
objection altogether by putting the declarant on the witness stand at trial.
Suppose in the midst of trial, the prosecutor calls as a witness an employee
of the defendant to simply testify that the defendant did, in fact, kill Jimmy
Hoffa. We would ask, alternatively, "were you there," in which case the
testimony would meet the threshold requirement of personal knowledge, or
"do you have authority to speak on behalf of the defendant," in which case
the testimony would be an authorized admission. If the answer to both our
questions were "no," we would promptly throw the witness out of court and
instruct the jury to disregard his testimony. We would do so because his
testimony is irrelevant. Personal knowledge and authorization are both
68. Id. at 238-39 n.21.
[Vol. 36
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questions of conditional relevancy.69 We would not say to the defendant,
"we will now permit you to cross examine this witness."
If the identity of the person who made a statement, or who adopted a
statement made by another, is a question of conditional relevance, what
logical basis is there to conclude that the existence of authority to speak on
behalf of another is not a question of conditional relevance? The theory of
admissibility is the same, i.e., that if you authorize others to speak on your
behalf you will be treated as though you made the statement yourself. Here
is how the U.S. Supreme Court explained the rationale for admission of
coconspirator statements:
It depends upon the principle that when any number of persons associate
themselves together in the prosecution of a common plan or enterprise,
lawful or unlawful, from the very act of association there arises a kind of
partnership, each member being constituted the agent of all, so that the act
or declaration of one, in furtherance of the common object, is the act of
all, and is admissible as primary and original evidence against them.70
Thus, the absence of authority renders the statement inadmissible for
the same reason: because the unauthorized statement is irrelevant. The only
rationale that supports the admission of authorized, agent or coconspirator
statements is the existence of express or implied authority to speak on
behalf of the party against whom the statement is offered. It is the same
rationale that supports the admission of direct or adopted admissions.
V. POST-BOURJAILY CONFUSION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The failure to identify a rationale that supports treating authorized
admissions differently than direct or adopted admissions has led some
federal courts to ignore the distinction altogether, and treat the preliminary
questions for all party admissions as Rule 104(a) questions to be decided by
the judge. 71 An example is the recent case of United States v. Garza.7"
Garza was charged in federal court with two sales of crack cocaine to an
informant working for a New Hampshire State Narcotics officer.73 The
transactions allegedly took place eight years before the charges were filed,
and tape recordings of telephone conversations between the informant and
seller had been destroyed.74  However, the state had transcripts of the
69. FED. R. EvID. 602, 901; CAL. EviD. CODE § 403(a)(2),(3) (West 2004).
70. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 249 (1917).
71. United States v. Garza, 435 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 2006).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 74.
74. Id. at 74-75.
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 669 2007-2008
SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
conversations and offered them as evidence. 75 The trial judge admitted
them as "past recollection[s] recorded," a somewhat problematical ruling
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5).76 But, the court of appeal
concluded it need not address that problem since the admission of the
transcript could be sustained as a party admission under Rule
801 (d)(2)(A). 77 The defendant argued that the transcript was not properly
authenticated as containing his own statements.78 The court of appeal
concluded there was no problem as long as there was sufficient evidence to
establish that Garza himself made the statements in the transcript, applying
a preponderance of the evidence standard.79 Citing Bourjaily, the court
concluded:
Questions of admissibility are decided by the court, Fed.[]R.[]Evid.
104(a), using the preponderance of the evidence standard. Bourjaily, 483
U.S. at 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775. So long as there is a preponderance of
evidence indicating that it was Garza's voice on the tapes, the transcripts
could be treated as containing his admission.
80
For two reasons, I believe this conclusion was wrong. First, the
identification of the defendant's voice is a question of authentication, to be
decided by the jury after presentation of independent evidence sufficient to
support a finding.81 Secondly, the use of Rule 104(a) to determine the
admissibility of party admissions is limited to admissions offered under
Rule 801 (d)(2)(C), (D) and (E), but not under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), as was the
case in Garza. 
82
The confusion on this issue is not limited to the federal courts, but
extends to leading commentators as well. To give you one example of a
court that got it exactly right, in United States v. Gil, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the admission of ledgers showing drug
transactions against two co-defendants.83 What's especially interesting
about this case is that two ledgers were found, one in the possession of
defendant Montoya, and one in the possession of defendant Gil.84 The
court found sufficient circumstantial evidence of their involvement in the
preparation of the ledgers to admit both as party admissions: Montoya's
75. Id. at 76.
76. Id. at 76-77.
77. Garza, 435 F.3d at 77.
78. Id. at 76.
79. Id. at 77.
80. Id.
81. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5) advisory committee's note.
82. Garza, 435 F.3d at 77.
83. United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).
84. Id. at 1417-18.
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ledger was admitted against him as a party admission and Gil's ledger was
admitted as a party admission against him. 85 However, the court held that
Montoya's ledger was admissible against Gil, and Gil's ledger was
admissible against Montoya, because both came within the coconspirator
exception.86 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court ruled that two
separate evidentiary paths must be traversed to consider this evidence. 87 To
consider the ledgers as party admissions against the defendant who
prepared them, Rule 104(b) applies, and upon the presentation of evidence
sufficient to support a finding, the question of whether the defendants
personally prepared the ledgers must be presented to the jury.88 But, to
consider them as coconspirator statements against the co-defendant, the
preliminary questions of membership in a conspiracy and its furtherance
were questions for the court under Bourjaily and required applying Rule
104(a). 89 Thus, the ledgers could be admitted based upon a preponderance
of the evidence.90 As bizarre as that seems, that is precisely what the
Federal Rules currently require, and I believe the Ninth Circuit Court got it
right. Yet, in their analysis of the Gil decision, Professors Saltzburg,
Martin and Capra take the court to task: "In our view, the question of
whether a proffered statement is that of the party is governed by the
preponderance standard of Rule 104(a), rather than the prima facie
evidence standard of Rule 104(b). We believe this result is mandated by
Bourjaily v. United States."9 1
Apparently, the professors would go beyond the Rules Committee, and
read Bourjaily as obliterating the conditional relevance rule for all five
categories of party admissions under Rule 801(d)(2). Some have suggested
Bourjaily even goes beyond that, obliterating conditional relevance for all
92hearsay exceptions. For example, imagine a claim that a prior
inconsistency was actually uttered by someone other than the witness being
impeached, or that an excited utterance actually was spoken by another
person in the crowd, not the person to whom a party attributes it. Federal
Rule 901 would only require evidence sufficient to support a finding, but
the broad reading some are giving to Bourjaily would obliterate Rule 901 as
well.
85. Id. at 1420-21.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1419-20.
88. Id. at 1419.
89. Gil, 58 F.3d at 1420.
90. Id. at 1420-21.
91. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, 4 FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 801, at 152-53 (8th ed. 2002).
92. United States v. Harvey, 117 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1997).
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VI. WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?
I realize that many courts, and many Evidence professors, may not
view with any particular alarm the potential demise of the conditional
relevance rule. Why not have the judge make all determinations of the
preliminary facts that determine the admissibility of evidence? Wouldn't it
be a lot simpler, and wouldn't we get more reliable determinations of
preliminary facts? Pondering that question led me back to the origins of the
conditional relevance rule, long before either the California Evidence Code
or the Federal Rules of Evidence existed. I found that a great deal of
inconsistency characterized the pre-rule era, and the leading scholars were
not particularly enamored with the idea of allowing juries to disregard
evidence if they concluded a foundational fact had not been established.
Here's how Professor Morgan put it:
Although it is a clumsy and intellectually dishonest expedient, it cannot be
condemned as utterly foreign to common law methodology. Many an
anachronistic doctrine has found its way out of the common law by some
such devious path. Usually on its journey out, however, it has sorely
discomfited litigants, lawyers and judges. If the time has come for these
rules of evidence to cease to trouble the course of litigation, it is to be
hoped that a more speedy and merciful means of extermination will be
found.
93
However, there does seem to be a grudging acceptance of the
proposition that a litigant may be deprived of his or her right to a jury trial
if the judge were allowed to decide a preliminary question of conditional
relevance with finality. The dilemma is neatly illustrated by the example
offered in the Comment of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary to section
403 of the California Evidence Code:
For example, if the question of A's title to land is in issue, A may seek to
prove his title by a deed from former owner 0. Section 1401 requires that
the deed be authenticated, and the judge, under Section 403, must rule on
the question of authentication. If A introduces evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding of the genuineness of the deed, the judge is required to
admit it. If the rule were otherwise and the judge, on the basis of the
adverse party's evidence, were permitted to decide that the deed was
spurious and not admissible, the judge would be resolving the basic
93. Edmund M. Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary
Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REv. 165, 191 (1929); cf John M. Maguire & Charles S. S.
Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L.
REv. 392, 392-93 (1926).
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factual issue in the case and A would be deprived of a jury finding on the
issue, even though he is entitled to a jury decision and even though he has
introduced evidence sufficient to warrant a jury finding in his favor. 94
One might fairly ask whether this is a scenario that could occur in the
context of a party admission. It certainly could, but only where the judge
excludes the evidence rather than admitting it. If the evidence is admitted,
even with finality, the jury will still wield power to give the evidence
whatever weight it wishes. If the party admission is excluded, however, the
party offering it may be deprived of a jury determination of whether
liability was admitted, even though there is evidence sufficient to warrant a
finding that the admission was, in fact, made, adopted or authorized by the
opposing party.
I find it interesting that one of the justifications offered for the
Bourjaily rule is that a higher standard of proof (a preponderance rather
than evidence sufficient to support a finding) will result in more frequent
exclusion of proffered coconspirator statements. For example, the current
authors of McCormick on Evidence attribute the Bourjaily ruling to "the
court's understandable wish to limit the use of conspiracy charges by
prosecutors. 95 That suggestion is laughable since the availability of the
"bootstrapping" procedure under the Bourjaily ruling more than offsets the
higher evidentiary standard, and assures the admission of coconspirator
statements in a great many more cases. Yet, the fact remains that whether
coconspirator statements are admitted or excluded will often determine the
outcome of a jury trial of a conspiracy case.
I must express real doubts whether, apart from the "bootstrapping"
rule, the difference between evidence sufficient to support a finding and
proof by a preponderance will make any difference whatsoever. I have
never met a judge who, when presented with evidence sufficient to support
a finding that a coconspirator statement is admissible, will not make the
finding and admit the statement. So the virtue of the conditional relevance
rule is simply that it preserves the right to a jury trial, for whatever it is
worth. Either way, the jury hears the coconspirator statement. But under
the conditional relevance approach of the California Evidence Code,
counsel can seek to persuade the jury to disregard it.96
Many will argue that it is not worth much in this setting. If the
statement is admitted subject to a jury finding of admissibility, will the jury
be able to disregard the statement itself in determining, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that all of the prerequisites for an admissible coconspirator
94. CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 (West 2004) law revision commission comments.
95. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 105 (6th ed. 2006).
96. CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 (West 2004).
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statement have been met? Is a jury capable of understanding and applying
the convoluted requirements of CALCRIM. No. 418? I, for one, believe
they are. Accordingly, we should not abandon the protection of a jury
determination in this setting, unless we are prepared to disenfranchise the
jury in every setting where we deem limiting instructions too complex. I
am not aware of a "complexity" exception to the constitutional guarantee of
trial by jury.
The greatest vulnerability of my position may be the suggestion that
my real objection is not to turning all questions of admissibility over to the
judge, but it is to allowing the judge to consider the questioned evidence
itself in determining whether the evidence is admissible. Is my real
objection to the hated (by me) "bootstrapping" rule? California made a
very conscious choice to reject "bootstrapping" when the California
Evidence Code was adopted, 97 and I believe that choice was a wise one.
The California Law Revision Commission recommended that
"bootstrapping" be permitted in making section 405 admissibility
determinations, but the Legislature rejected that recommendation.98 What if
we modified the California Evidence Code to make the admissibility of
party admissions section 405 questions, rather than section 403 questions,
without abandoning the California Evidence Code's forthright rejection of
the "bootstrapping" rule? I must confess that such a proposed change
would not get me as worked up as the prospect of totally federalizing the
California Evidence Code by adding Rule 104(a) to its provisions, even
though it would reduce the level of protection we give to the right to a jury
trial. But what principle would justify limiting such a change to party
admissions? Why should preliminary questions about the identity of a
declarant or the existence of adoption or authority be treated differently
than preliminary questions of personal knowledge or authentication? They
are all questions of conditional relevance, and I have yet to hear an
argument that justifies treating them differently in allocating the
responsibility between judge and jury to decide them. Otto Kaus concluded
his critique with a pertinent observation: "Admittedly, to desire structure
for structure's sake is childish. If a particular departure from orthodoxy is
commanded by sound policy, one should give it a try." 99
I would like to conclude with the same observation. I do not find in the
Bourjaily opinion any sound principle or policy to single out coconspirator
statements and treat them differently than other questions of conditional
97. FED. R. EVID. 104, advisory committee note; see CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 (West 2004).
98. MtNDEZ, supra note 10, at 341, § 17.05; cf FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory committee's
note.
99. Kaus, supra note 9, at 252.
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relevancy. I do not find in the report of the Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee recommending the subsequent amendment of Rule
801(d)(2) any sound principle or policy to single out authorized or agent
admissions and treat them differently than direct or adopted admissions, or,
for that matter, any other questions of conditional relevancy. I do not find
in any of the reported federal decisions any sound principle or policy to
treat all party admissions differently than other questions of conditional
relevancy. The structure erected in the California Evidence Code by
sections 403 and 405 should be maintained, not just because it is rational
and symmetrical and protects the right to jury trial, but because there is no
sound principle or policy to justify changing it.
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